The Euro-Atlantic divisions and the Greek Veto
Damianos Serefidis
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva
NATO’s latest summit in Bucharest didn’t constitute a cornerstone for the Organization’s role and function. It didn’t even constitute an opportunity for a clear definition and re-evaluation of its goals and procedural matters. It seems that the Euroatlantic Alliance shows a kind of “European Union” syndrome: that is, the tendency to seek for legitimacy of its existence through a continuous process of enlargement, instead of focusing also on the “deepening” of its mission and institutional functions. In other words, the reason of its existence goes hand-in-hand with its eagerness to increase the number of its members.
And although the up to date enlargement of the European Union to the East did not meet a particularly fierce opposition by Putin’s Russian Federation, the eventual future enlargement of NATO, particularly towards countries who are within the sphere of Russia’s influence (such as Ukraine, and Georgia), along with the difficult diplomatic situation that is being created because of the uncertainty that dominates the negotiations over the famous anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe, send hostile cold-war messages to Moscow, despite the statements by the US government that Cold-War has finished.
On the one hand we have Ukraine, with a particular strong pro-Russian stance supported and reinforced by the substantial Russian minority, mostly in the Crimean area and with direct energy dependence on Russia (the famous gas dispute). On the other hand, we have Georgia who despite its pro-Western turn of the after Shevardnadze era (Rose Revolution), has realized that the Russia is the one who handles and controls the economic and geostrategic game in the region. In addition, the case of Georgia is even more sensible due to the continuous fragile situation related to the autonomous province of Abkhazia. Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use the autonomous province as instrument of pressure against Georgia’s pro-western agenda. A striking example that confirms this pattern is the latest (March 6, 2008) statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation declaring that Russia would withdraw itself from the CIS treaty of 1996 which, among other things, had imposed sanctions on Georgia’s breakaway region by banning trade, economic, financial, transport and other links. And this withdrawal is because, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, there was a “change of circumstances.”
It seems that the case of Kosovo has opened the way for Russia to control its own backyard by using regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia who on their own side have found the opportunity to develop their own independence agenda.
It is not only that the word “enlargement” sounds awkward in the ears of the Europeans, particularly after the experienced difficulties in coordinating all the voices inside the European Union and also the profound lack of harmony and collegiality among the member states, neither that the eventual accession to the Euroatlantic Alliance of two “sensible” countries constitutes a matter for further discussions and negotiations without the Europeans being forced to follow the initiatives of a US administration with an expiration date. There is an additional element; that the decision over NATO’s enlargement enters also the domain of energy diplomacy. Russia is a major supplier of natural gas and oil for the EU, and mostly for Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Finland, and Lithuania. The German-Russian relationship has improved in this particular domain and at the core of this we find the common energy project that includes the construction of an undersea pipeline of 800km, which is planned to cross the Baltic Sea. Therefore, it shouldn’t strike us as strange the fact that any diplomatic friction with the Russian Federation on the issue of NATO enlargement, which seems not to be (at least for the moment) the first priority for the Europeans, would undermine the flourishing energy business, given the fact that Russia has proven repeatedly that plays this card really hard.
The Greek Veto
With this overheat of geostrategic, economic and energy interests, as well as with the desperate effort of the US government to remind Europeans that the issue of Afghanistan is still in the agenda, and there is a need to reinforce the allied presence there, the issue of the accession of FYROM to the Euroatlantic Alliance along with the name issue, have been placed down on the list of the summit’s priorities. The Greek government didn’t receive substantial pressure for the FYROM issue, which does not have either an energy neither a serious geostrategic importance, as the center of international interest has moved northwards to its neighbor, the newly established Republic of Kosovo. Therefore, the Greek veto seemed to come as natural and it was supported by countries such as France and Spain. The diplomatic space for maneuvers has seriously been restrained for FYROM, after also the statement from the Greek government that in case of no solution to the name issue and possible continuation of intransigence from the Slavo-macedonian side the Greek side will be obliged to oppose FYROM’s path to EU. For FYROM, the stagnant situation related to Kosovo’s independence, and the risk of revival of the Yugoslav war-ghost, were creating space for intransigence and time-wasting, in the belief that the name issue would be solved automatically in its favor. However, it seems that it was Greece who was buying time and not FYROM. The declaration of independence of Kosovo was not followed, until today, by any serious crisis in the region, and the Slavo-macedonian fear for a domino effect in the western provinces of Tetovo and Gostivar (both populated by an Albanian minority) has not yet been proved real. The viability of the Republic of Kosovo is being overtly supported by the US government, which is planning to strengthen its military presence in the area. The center of international interest, and particularly of US interest, has been moved from FYROM to Kosovo.
What is to be done?
a) In the face of these diplomatic developments, the Greek government should continue to follow a low-profile strategy. Using a veto is a sensible matter, which has to be handled with care. The Greek side should make clear that using the veto does not mean automatically a break of diplomatic relations with FYROM.
b) Both sides should continue to follow the way of diplomatic dialogue and it is imperative not to react to any nationalist paranoia that will come up as a result of the Bucharest NATO Summit.
c) The flourishing economic relations between Greece and FYROM as well as the continuous cultural exchanges of the last fifteen years should lead the way towards minimizing the effects of “us” against “them” spirit that has been intensified just before and after the Bucharest Summit.
