Modern Greek Mythology

[By Racalbuto, Le Matin]

To move or not to move?

The one Guard of the Parliament to the other: "Hey Mitso, am I supposed to move or to stay still?"

Clash of generations: the divide and rule of modern regimes?

(PHOTO: Yiorgos Karahalis/Reuters)

The recent events in Greece, after the cold blood assassination of the 15-year-old student in Exarhia (Athens) by a police officer have opened up a big debate on the social and economic situation of many Greek citizens and the way those socio-economic grievances are to be expressed. Political distrust, inter-personal distrust and lack of personal efficacy are some of the feelings of the Greek citizen, who, paradoxically though stays loyal to his basic civil right of participating in national elections (one of the highest turn-out percentages in European Union) voting in crushing majority for the same two big parties who are accused for the current gloomy economic and social conditions.

The recent violent events in Athens and other major Greek cities should be seen under a specific analytical prism. First of all, it seems to me that we should distinguish between on one side, the people who participate in daily demonstrations claiming their right to express their grievances about the unorganized and sometimes exaggerated and irrational use of police force and their opposition to the current governmental policies and its incapacity to provide the Greek people with concrete answers on the barrage of economic scandals, and on the other side normless-hooligans who find the opportunity to demonstrate their internal rage and emptiness by creating havoc through destruction and pillaging.

Second, it is true the fact that the assassination of the young student was not the cause of the subsequent mobilization and violent event, but the effet declencheur which brought on the surface a 15-year-policy of austerity measures which was used in the beginning as an excuse in order to attain the national goal of integration to the common European currency in January 2002, but which continued as a new plan of tight economic measures under which salaries remained virtually unchanged when at the same time prices were soaring. The introduction of EURO currency along with the lack of serious institutional ways and political will of controlling the prices in liberal professions, as well as the transformation of a great number of goods of luxury into goods of first necessity (i.e. cell-phones and other services of telecommunications) forced many families into the new national sport, the “bank credits”. Furthemore, a first salary of 700 to 1000 Euros/month is really not enough for a young man to hope for a happy family life, when only the monthly cell-phone bills (4-member family) can reach 300Euros. No wonder why Greeks can be considered to be the Europeans “most attached” to their parental home up to the age of 30.

Third, it is important to mention that despite all the grievances, the economic scandals, and the irregular cases of police repression, we haven’t yet seen a massive popular mobilization. Really, where are all those people who have seen their quality of life being degraded in the last years? Where are all those families who are under the pressure of a series of bank debts and who try to cover up economic holes of summer vacations with new “Christmas Consumption Credits”? All we have seen is student manifestations during the day and street battles between “anarchists” and the police forces.

The authorities response to this crisis was to create confusion between destruction/”anti-democratic behavior” and legitimate claims for economic and social fairness, and on the other hand between student youth and “anarchists”/hooligans. Governmental officials have neither pronounced on the issue of economic and social difficulties, nor have they tried to draw a line between the young students and the “young” “anarchists”. The cornerstone of the actual debate has become the question of “who are those people with the covered faces” and not “what is the problem with the young generation of today”. The authorities have played the security card of “terrorism by the young hooligans”, who vandalize private property. In this way the same authorities aim at digging a wider gap between the young generation of 16-17-18 year old and the older generations who are integrated in the economic and social life. Following the experience of the last year’s widespread student mobilization against the revision of Article 16 of the Constitution which would authorize the creation of private universities, there are plenty of people who started expressing themselves in the media claiming that “it’s better for those young  generations to try hard in their studies in order to become good citizens” rather than following the easy way of violence inspired by meager social sensibilities.

Pitting Universalism against Cultural Relativism?

This text is a simple product of a reaction to the lecture of the 1986 Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature, Mr. Wole Soyinka, given in Geneva for the Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948, in Paris.

In his lecture, Mr. Soyinka made clear to his audience his view about the juxtaposition of Universalism and Cultural Relativism. The title of his presentation was “The Trap of Cultural Relativism”, and therefore from the title the tone of his speech was far from being in favor of the cultural relativist trend. He started by defining cultural relativism as a state of mutual respect and a framework of acknowledgment of cultural diversity, which however, allows any kind of conduct as long as it is defined in cultural terms, and [I would add] as long as it puts an emphasis on the cultural particularity of the actor. Based on this definition he argued that on such a basis, barbarism and other forms of violence and degradation of the human nature could easily be understood and excused as forms of cultural particularity. Dignity and the social nature of human beings are the ethical and moral norms to be respected and they constitute the important universal values, which under no circumstances should be sacrificed in the name of dogmatic cultural principles and obligations. Besides, according to Mr. Soyinka, the processes and conditions of human upbringing and development are not to be a matter of distinction among human beings nor have to limit the freedom of choice among different perceptions of life.

Mr. Soyinka’s short lecture of Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism brings us back to one of the fundamental debates of liberal tradition, between the liberal communitarians (Will Kymlicka, Iris Marion Young etc.) and liberal cosmopolitans (Jeremy Waldron, Brian Barry, Chandran Kukathas etc), based on the relationship between the individual and its social environment. While on the one hand, the liberal communitarians highlight the importance of cultural membership, as well as the importance to protect the cultural structures (groups) along with their content and their practices, on the other hand, liberal cosmopolitans defend the protection of the rights of individuals and their right to adhere to practices without the formal recognition of the cultural structure. Thus, for cosmopolitans, inspired by the Rawlsian assumption that the right of people to seek for alternatives in order to satisfy their needs and pursue their ends excludes the necessity of the perpetual existence of any particular culture, any culture should not be seen as a legitimate framework to cover up violations of the individual freedom (of choice). In the liberal tradition this debate can be summed up with two notions: external protection vs. internal control.

However, my point here is not to analyze the different variants of the liberal tradition, but to make a specific methodological comment on Mr. Soyinka’s argument. In my opinion, Universalism and Cultural (Historical, Regional, Economic etc.) Relativism should not be considered as two competitive visions in the human rights discourse. Far from presenting myself as somebody who could propose a compromise between them, I think that there is a space to perceive them in a more constructive relationship. What I mean is that, on purely theoretical basis, we have failed to see what are these visions made of. I believe that both Universalism and Cultural Relativism are made of two parts:

a) a part presenting them as frameworks of thought about norms and ideas and,

b) a part that conceives them as arguments to justify various policies.

In the end by avoiding the Trap of Cultural Relativism we sometimes tend to fall into the Trap of Ethic and Moral Universalism with the subsequent risks that our modern history has experienced. And I justify this by saying that the spokespersons of Universalism in human rights tend to overestimate the philosophical ethical and moral value of Universalism and to omit to comment on the nature of some actions taken in the name of it, whereas on the other hand, they put emphasis more on the practical implications of Cultural Relativism which they tend to relate it to the notion of non-intervention in internal affairs (of a group or a state), without mentioning the fundamental Herderian moral and ethical principles of respect and acknowledgment of cultural diversity and cultural protection, which are taken for granted.

Saying that, I do not argue against fundamental universal norms, values and principles, and I do not claim that the protection of a cultural social environment has a priority over human dignity and freedom. Instead, I believe that norms, values and principles are not fixed elements in our evaluation system. They can be discussed, evaluated, and reviewed. And a cultural relativist vision with its ethical and moral principles can become a framework of understanding of specific human actions and therefore become a pool of culturally, historically, regionally, socially diverse ideas to be discussed and evaluated in the process of reinforcing existing or drafting new Universal values and norms. At the end of the day, in our world, the Socratic claim of the existence of more than one truths seems to fit better than the one of the religious dogmatic objective (divine) truth.

An interesting website on public's feelings during this US election period. Click HERE to see and to "add your feelings".

You can see also the differences between Obama and McCain supporters.

Comment on US economy

Marc Faber comment on US economy -

Investment analyst and entrepreneur Dr. Marc Faber concluded
his monthly bulletin (June 2008) with the Following:

''The federal government is sending each of us a $600 rebate.
If we spend that money at Wal-Mart, the money goes to China.
If we spend it on gasoline it goes to the Arabs. If we buy
a computer it will go to India. If we purchase fruit and
vegetables it will go to Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala. If
we purchase a good car it will go to Germany/Japan. If we
purchase useless crap it will go to Taiwan and none of it will
help the America economy. The only way to keep that money here
at home is to spend it on prostitutes and beer, since these
are the only products still produced in US. I've been doing
my part.'

Please find an interesting analysis on Kosovo's independence by International Relations and Security Network based in Zurich:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18833

Also find couple of articles on the story of Del Ponte's new book "The Hunt":

http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/9225/
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080408/104105245.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/04/11/wserb111.xml
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/front/Del_Ponte_war_crimes_book_stirs_up_a_storm.html?siteSect=105&sid=8951789&cKey=1207755740000&ty=st

The Euro-Atlantic divisions and the Greek Veto

Damianos Serefidis

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva

NATO’s latest summit in Bucharest didn’t constitute a cornerstone for the Organization’s role and function. It didn’t even constitute an opportunity for a clear definition and re-evaluation of its goals and procedural matters. It seems that the Euroatlantic Alliance shows a kind of “European Union” syndrome: that is, the tendency to seek for legitimacy of its existence through a continuous process of enlargement, instead of focusing also on the “deepening” of its mission and institutional functions. In other words, the reason of its existence goes hand-in-hand with its eagerness to increase the number of its members.

And although the up to date enlargement of the European Union to the East did not meet a particularly fierce opposition by Putin’s Russian Federation, the eventual future enlargement of NATO, particularly towards countries who are within the sphere of Russia’s influence (such as Ukraine, and Georgia), along with the difficult diplomatic situation that is being created because of the uncertainty that dominates the negotiations over the famous anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe, send hostile cold-war messages to Moscow, despite the statements by the US government that Cold-War has finished.

On the one hand we have Ukraine, with a particular strong pro-Russian stance supported and reinforced by the substantial Russian minority, mostly in the Crimean area and with direct energy dependence on Russia (the famous gas dispute). On the other hand, we have Georgia who despite its pro-Western turn of the after Shevardnadze era (Rose Revolution), has realized that the Russia is the one who handles and controls the economic and geostrategic game in the region. In addition, the case of Georgia is even more sensible due to the continuous fragile situation related to the autonomous province of Abkhazia. Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use the autonomous province as instrument of pressure against Georgia’s pro-western agenda. A striking example that confirms this pattern is the latest (March 6, 2008) statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation declaring that Russia would withdraw itself from the CIS treaty of 1996 which, among other things, had imposed sanctions on Georgia’s breakaway region by banning trade, economic, financial, transport and other links. And this withdrawal is because, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, there was a “change of circumstances.”

It seems that the case of Kosovo has opened the way for Russia to control its own backyard by using regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia who on their own side have found the opportunity to develop their own independence agenda.

It is not only that the word “enlargement” sounds awkward in the ears of the Europeans, particularly after the experienced difficulties in coordinating all the voices inside the European Union and also the profound lack of harmony and collegiality among the member states, neither that the eventual accession to the Euroatlantic Alliance of two “sensible” countries constitutes a matter for further discussions and negotiations without the Europeans being forced to follow the initiatives of a US administration with an expiration date. There is an additional element; that the decision over NATO’s enlargement enters also the domain of energy diplomacy. Russia is a major supplier of natural gas and oil for the EU, and mostly for Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Finland, and Lithuania. The German-Russian relationship has improved in this particular domain and at the core of this we find the common energy project that includes the construction of an undersea pipeline of 800km, which is planned to cross the Baltic Sea. Therefore, it shouldn’t strike us as strange the fact that any diplomatic friction with the Russian Federation on the issue of NATO enlargement, which seems not to be (at least for the moment) the first priority for the Europeans, would undermine the flourishing energy business, given the fact that Russia has proven repeatedly that plays this card really hard.

The Greek Veto

With this overheat of geostrategic, economic and energy interests, as well as with the desperate effort of the US government to remind Europeans that the issue of Afghanistan is still in the agenda, and there is a need to reinforce the allied presence there, the issue of the accession of FYROM to the Euroatlantic Alliance along with the name issue, have been placed down on the list of the summit’s priorities. The Greek government didn’t receive substantial pressure for the FYROM issue, which does not have either an energy neither a serious geostrategic importance, as the center of international interest has moved northwards to its neighbor, the newly established Republic of Kosovo. Therefore, the Greek veto seemed to come as natural and it was supported by countries such as France and Spain. The diplomatic space for maneuvers has seriously been restrained for FYROM, after also the statement from the Greek government that in case of no solution to the name issue and possible continuation of intransigence from the Slavo-macedonian side the Greek side will be obliged to oppose FYROM’s path to EU. For FYROM, the stagnant situation related to Kosovo’s independence, and the risk of revival of the Yugoslav war-ghost, were creating space for intransigence and time-wasting, in the belief that the name issue would be solved automatically in its favor. However, it seems that it was Greece who was buying time and not FYROM. The declaration of independence of Kosovo was not followed, until today, by any serious crisis in the region, and the Slavo-macedonian fear for a domino effect in the western provinces of Tetovo and Gostivar (both populated by an Albanian minority) has not yet been proved real. The viability of the Republic of Kosovo is being overtly supported by the US government, which is planning to strengthen its military presence in the area. The center of international interest, and particularly of US interest, has been moved from FYROM to Kosovo.

What is to be done?

a) In the face of these diplomatic developments, the Greek government should continue to follow a low-profile strategy. Using a veto is a sensible matter, which has to be handled with care. The Greek side should make clear that using the veto does not mean automatically a break of diplomatic relations with FYROM.

b) Both sides should continue to follow the way of diplomatic dialogue and it is imperative not to react to any nationalist paranoia that will come up as a result of the Bucharest NATO Summit.

c) The flourishing economic relations between Greece and FYROM as well as the continuous cultural exchanges of the last fifteen years should lead the way towards minimizing the effects of “us” against “them” spirit that has been intensified just before and after the Bucharest Summit.

Ο Ευρωατλαντικός Διχασμός και το Ελληνικό Βέτο

Η σύνοδος κορυφής του ΝΑΤΟ στο Βουκουρέστι δεν απετέλεσε εντέλει σταθμό για την πορεία της Ευρωατλαντικής Συμμαχίας. Δυστυχώς δεν απετέλεσε ούτε καν μια ευκαιρία για ξεκάθαρο επαναπροσδιορισμό των στόχων και των λειτουργιών της. Φαίνεται ότι ο συγκεκριμένος οργανισμός αρχίζει να εμφανίζει το σύνδρομο « Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης», δηλαδή τείνει να νομιμοποιεί την ύπαρξή του όχι μέσω προσπαθειών αναπροσαρμογής και επανεξέτασης των θεσμικών του λειτουργιών και στόχων, αλλά μέσω μιας διαρκούς τάσης για επέκταση. Με άλλα λόγια, ο λόγος ύπαρξής του συμβαδίζει με την ικανότητά του να αυξάνει τον αριθμό των μελών του. Αν και η μέχρι τώρα επέκταση της Ευρωπαϊκής ΄Ενωσης προς ανατολάς δεν αντιμε-τωπίστηκε με ιδιαίτερη εχθρότητα από τη Ρωσία του Πούτιν, η επικείμενη επέκταση του ΝΑΤΟ , ιδίως προς τις χώρες άμεσης επιρροής της τελευταίας ( Ουκρανία , Γεωργία ), σε συνδυασμό με την δύσκολη διπλωματική κατάσταση που δημιουργεί η ασάφεια σχετικά με την αντιπυραυλική ασπίδα στην ανατολική Ευρώπη, στέλνει ψυχροπολεμικά μηνύματα προς την Μόσχα, παρ’ όλες τις διαβεβαιώσεις της κυβέρνησης των ΗΠΑ ότι ο Ψυχρός Πόλεμος έχει παρέλθει οριστικά .

Από τη μια πλευρά βρίσκεται η Ουκρανία, με ισχυρή φιλορωσική τάση που υποστηρίζεται από μια σημαντική ρωσική μειονότητα, κυρίως στην περιοχή της Κριμαίας, και με άμεση ενεργειακή εξάρτηση από τη Ρωσία ( η περίφημη διαμάχη του αερίου ). Από την άλλη πλευρά η Γεωργία που παρ’ όλη τις φιλοδυτική στροφή (επανάσταση των ρόδων) της μετα- Σεβαρντνάτζε εποχής, έχει αντιληφθεί ότι το γεωστρατηγικό και οικονομικό παιχνίδι στην περιοχή ελέγχεται από τη Ρωσία. Επιπλέον η περίπτωση της Γεωργίας είναι ακόμη πιο ευαίσθητη λόγω της μόνιμα τεταμένης κατάστασης με την αυτόνομη επαρχία της Απχαζίας, την οποία κατάσταση η Ρωσία τείνει να χρησιμοποιεί ως μοχλό πίεσης ενάντια σε οποιεσδήποτε φιλοδυτι-κές τάσεις της Γεωργίας. Δεν είναι τυχαίο ότι μόλις πρόσφατα , στις 6 Μαρτίου 2008, το ρωσικό Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών ανακοίνωσε ότι η Ρωσία αποχωρεί από την Συνθήκη του 1996 της Κοινοπολιτείας των Ανεξαρτήτων Κρατών η οποία προέβλεπε, μεταξύ άλλων και την αποφυγή οποιασδήποτε οικονομικής, εμπορικής και άλλης συνεργασίας με την αυτόνομη αυτή περιοχή. Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες του Radio Free Europe, ο λόγος της συγκεκριμένης αποχώρησης σχετίζεται με την μεταβολή των συνθηκών. Φαίνεται ότι το « προηγούμενο » του Κοσόβου αποτελεί για τη Ρωσία ένα ισχυρό διπλωματικό μέσο πίεσης στην άμεση σφαίρα επιρροής της με κύριο στόχο την Απχαζία και την Νότια Οσετία, οι οποίες βρήκαν στο Κόσοβο ένα ιδανικό μοντέλο για να προβάρουν τις δικές τους τάσεις ανεξαρτησίας.

Δεν είναι μόνον ότι η λέξη « διεύρυνση» ηχεί κάπως άσχημα στα αυτιά των ευρωπαί-ων, ιδιαίτερα μετά από τις εμφανείς δυσκολίες συντονισμού, από την έλλειψη αρμο-νίας και «collegiality » μεταξύ των 27 πλέον χωρών της Ε.Ε, ούτε μόνον ότι η ένταξη στο ΝΑΤΟ δύο « ευαίσθητων» χωρών αποτελεί πράγματι ένα θέμα που χρήζει ενδελεχούς εξέτασης χωρίς να είναι αναγκασμένοι οι Ευρωπαίοι να ακολουθούν το άρμα μιας αμερικανικής κυβέρνησης με ημερομηνία λήξης, αλλά και ότι το θέμα εισέρχεται επίσης στα νερά της ενεργειακής διπλωματίας. Η Ρωσία αποτελεί τον κύριο προμηθευτή αερίου και πετρελαίου της ΕΕ με κύριους καταναλωτές την Γερμανία, Μ. Βρετανία, Ιταλία, Πολωνία, Φινλανδία, Λιθουανία. Οι σχέσεις , κυρίως της Γερμανίας με την Ρωσία έχουν βελτιωθεί αισθητά στον χώρο αυτό, με κεντρικό σημείο την διμερή συνεργασία για την κατασκευή υποθαλάσσιου αγωγού μήκους 800 χιλιομέτρων που θα διασχίζει την Βαλτική. Είναι κατανοητό λοιπόν ότι μια διπλωμα-τική ρήξη με τη Ρωσία για ένα θέμα που δεν είναι πρώτης προτεραιότητας για τους Ευρωπαίους ενδεχομένως να χαλούσε αυτήν την ενεργειακή συνεργασία.

Το Ελληνικό βέτο

Μέσα σε αυτήν την αναταραχή γεωστρατηγικών, οικονομικών και ενεργειακών βλέψεων και συμφερόντων καθώς και με την απέλπιδα προσπάθεια του αμερικανού Προέδρου να υπενθυμίσει στους ευρωπαίους εταίρους ότι υπάρχει ακόμη σε εξέλιξη η προσπάθεια βελτίωσης της κατάστασης στο Αφγανιστάν, το θέμα της ένταξης της ΠΓΔΜ σε συνδυασμό με το θέμα της ονομασίας πέρασε, όπως γίνεται αντιληπτό, σε δεύτερη μοίρα. Η Ελληνική Κυβέρνηση δεν συνάντησε ουσιαστική πίεση για μια χώρα όπως ο ΠΓΔΜ η οποία δεν έχει ούτε ενεργειακό ούτε σημαντικό γεωστρατηγικό ενδιαφέρον, επειδή το ενδιαφέρον μετατοπίστηκε στο γειτονικό Κόσοβο. Το ελληνικό βέτο ήρθε φυσιολογικά ενώ έτυχε και της υποστήριξης χωρών όπως της Γαλλίας , της Ισπανίας κλπ. Η ΠΓΔΜ αρχίζει να αντιλαμβάνεται ότι τα διπλωματικά όρια στενεύουν αισθητά, πόσο μάλλον ύστερα και από τη δήλωση ότι σε περίπτωση μη λύσης, η ελληνική πλευρά θα προβάλει αντίσταση σε ενδεχόμενη έναρξη της ενταξιακής διαδικασίας αυτής της χώρας στην ΕΕ. Για την ΠΓΔΜ, όσο το θέμα της ανεξαρτησίας του Κοσόβου αποτελούσε κίνδυνο για τη σταθερότητα της περιοχής, υπήρχε έδαφος για αδιαλλαξία και παρελκυστική τακτική. Τελικά όμως αποδεικνύεται μέχρι στιγμής ότι αυτός που κέρδιζε χρόνο ήταν η Ελλάδα και όχι η ΠΓΔΜ. Πλέον, τα χρονικά όρια ένταξης της βόρειας γείτονος στενεύουν. Επιπλέον η ανεξαρτησία του Κοσόβου ήρθε χωρίς ιδιαίτερες ανακατατάξεις και ταραχές, ενώ η γεωστρατηγική του ενίσχυση επίκειται, μεταφέροντας το κέντρο βάρους της διεθνούς προσοχής από την ΠΓΔΜ στο Κόσοβο.