This text is a simple product of a reaction to the lecture of the 1986 Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature, Mr. Wole Soyinka, given in Geneva for the Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948, in Paris.
In his lecture, Mr. Soyinka made clear to his audience his view about the juxtaposition of Universalism and Cultural Relativism. The title of his presentation was “The Trap of Cultural Relativism”, and therefore from the title the tone of his speech was far from being in favor of the cultural relativist trend. He started by defining cultural relativism as a state of mutual respect and a framework of acknowledgment of cultural diversity, which however, allows any kind of conduct as long as it is defined in cultural terms, and [I would add] as long as it puts an emphasis on the cultural particularity of the actor. Based on this definition he argued that on such a basis, barbarism and other forms of violence and degradation of the human nature could easily be understood and excused as forms of cultural particularity. Dignity and the social nature of human beings are the ethical and moral norms to be respected and they constitute the important universal values, which under no circumstances should be sacrificed in the name of dogmatic cultural principles and obligations. Besides, according to Mr. Soyinka, the processes and conditions of human upbringing and development are not to be a matter of distinction among human beings nor have to limit the freedom of choice among different perceptions of life.
Mr. Soyinka’s short lecture of Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism brings us back to one of the fundamental debates of liberal tradition, between the liberal communitarians (Will Kymlicka, Iris Marion Young etc.) and liberal cosmopolitans (Jeremy Waldron, Brian Barry, Chandran Kukathas etc), based on the relationship between the individual and its social environment. While on the one hand, the liberal communitarians highlight the importance of cultural membership, as well as the importance to protect the cultural structures (groups) along with their content and their practices, on the other hand, liberal cosmopolitans defend the protection of the rights of individuals and their right to adhere to practices without the formal recognition of the cultural structure. Thus, for cosmopolitans, inspired by the Rawlsian assumption that the right of people to seek for alternatives in order to satisfy their needs and pursue their ends excludes the necessity of the perpetual existence of any particular culture, any culture should not be seen as a legitimate framework to cover up violations of the individual freedom (of choice). In the liberal tradition this debate can be summed up with two notions: external protection vs. internal control.
However, my point here is not to analyze the different variants of the liberal tradition, but to make a specific methodological comment on Mr. Soyinka’s argument. In my opinion, Universalism and Cultural (Historical, Regional, Economic etc.) Relativism should not be considered as two competitive visions in the human rights discourse. Far from presenting myself as somebody who could propose a compromise between them, I think that there is a space to perceive them in a more constructive relationship. What I mean is that, on purely theoretical basis, we have failed to see what are these visions made of. I believe that both Universalism and Cultural Relativism are made of two parts:
In his lecture, Mr. Soyinka made clear to his audience his view about the juxtaposition of Universalism and Cultural Relativism. The title of his presentation was “The Trap of Cultural Relativism”, and therefore from the title the tone of his speech was far from being in favor of the cultural relativist trend. He started by defining cultural relativism as a state of mutual respect and a framework of acknowledgment of cultural diversity, which however, allows any kind of conduct as long as it is defined in cultural terms, and [I would add] as long as it puts an emphasis on the cultural particularity of the actor. Based on this definition he argued that on such a basis, barbarism and other forms of violence and degradation of the human nature could easily be understood and excused as forms of cultural particularity. Dignity and the social nature of human beings are the ethical and moral norms to be respected and they constitute the important universal values, which under no circumstances should be sacrificed in the name of dogmatic cultural principles and obligations. Besides, according to Mr. Soyinka, the processes and conditions of human upbringing and development are not to be a matter of distinction among human beings nor have to limit the freedom of choice among different perceptions of life.
Mr. Soyinka’s short lecture of Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism brings us back to one of the fundamental debates of liberal tradition, between the liberal communitarians (Will Kymlicka, Iris Marion Young etc.) and liberal cosmopolitans (Jeremy Waldron, Brian Barry, Chandran Kukathas etc), based on the relationship between the individual and its social environment. While on the one hand, the liberal communitarians highlight the importance of cultural membership, as well as the importance to protect the cultural structures (groups) along with their content and their practices, on the other hand, liberal cosmopolitans defend the protection of the rights of individuals and their right to adhere to practices without the formal recognition of the cultural structure. Thus, for cosmopolitans, inspired by the Rawlsian assumption that the right of people to seek for alternatives in order to satisfy their needs and pursue their ends excludes the necessity of the perpetual existence of any particular culture, any culture should not be seen as a legitimate framework to cover up violations of the individual freedom (of choice). In the liberal tradition this debate can be summed up with two notions: external protection vs. internal control.
However, my point here is not to analyze the different variants of the liberal tradition, but to make a specific methodological comment on Mr. Soyinka’s argument. In my opinion, Universalism and Cultural (Historical, Regional, Economic etc.) Relativism should not be considered as two competitive visions in the human rights discourse. Far from presenting myself as somebody who could propose a compromise between them, I think that there is a space to perceive them in a more constructive relationship. What I mean is that, on purely theoretical basis, we have failed to see what are these visions made of. I believe that both Universalism and Cultural Relativism are made of two parts:
a) a part presenting them as frameworks of thought about norms and ideas and,
b) a part that conceives them as arguments to justify various policies.
In the end by avoiding the Trap of Cultural Relativism we sometimes tend to fall into the Trap of Ethic and Moral Universalism with the subsequent risks that our modern history has experienced. And I justify this by saying that the spokespersons of Universalism in human rights tend to overestimate the philosophical ethical and moral value of Universalism and to omit to comment on the nature of some actions taken in the name of it, whereas on the other hand, they put emphasis more on the practical implications of Cultural Relativism which they tend to relate it to the notion of non-intervention in internal affairs (of a group or a state), without mentioning the fundamental Herderian moral and ethical principles of respect and acknowledgment of cultural diversity and cultural protection, which are taken for granted.
Saying that, I do not argue against fundamental universal norms, values and principles, and I do not claim that the protection of a cultural social environment has a priority over human dignity and freedom. Instead, I believe that norms, values and principles are not fixed elements in our evaluation system. They can be discussed, evaluated, and reviewed. And a cultural relativist vision with its ethical and moral principles can become a framework of understanding of specific human actions and therefore become a pool of culturally, historically, regionally, socially diverse ideas to be discussed and evaluated in the process of reinforcing existing or drafting new Universal values and norms. At the end of the day, in our world, the Socratic claim of the existence of more than one truths seems to fit better than the one of the religious dogmatic objective (divine) truth.
Saying that, I do not argue against fundamental universal norms, values and principles, and I do not claim that the protection of a cultural social environment has a priority over human dignity and freedom. Instead, I believe that norms, values and principles are not fixed elements in our evaluation system. They can be discussed, evaluated, and reviewed. And a cultural relativist vision with its ethical and moral principles can become a framework of understanding of specific human actions and therefore become a pool of culturally, historically, regionally, socially diverse ideas to be discussed and evaluated in the process of reinforcing existing or drafting new Universal values and norms. At the end of the day, in our world, the Socratic claim of the existence of more than one truths seems to fit better than the one of the religious dogmatic objective (divine) truth.
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